

SPEECH

by

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before

SOUTHERN COUNCIL

ON

INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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I am delighted to be here and to have an opportunity to talk to you a little bit about something which most of my 35 years in Government have been specifically addressed to and that is, namely, the question of intelligence.

I think that one of the great questions that people ask all the time is: What is this intelligence about which people talk so much; what is it and what does it mean to the United States. Well, intelligence is information on actions, capabilities, intentions--political, military, economic, financial--of foreign countries that may have some impact upon our life. It may affect our living in some way. In the old days the outside world was very far to the United States. The United States had an enormous cushion of time at both sides: any foreign event that occurred could be very long delayed in any impact on the United States. As a matter of fact, President Madison once commented that he hadn't heard from his Ambassador in Spain in two years and if he didn't hear from him pretty soon, he was going to send someone over to find out what was going on in Spain.

Well, we live in a very different world. We live in a world where almost immediate decisions are required. The means of communication we have today have put our leaders

in a position where they've got to make decisions about things almost immediately. They haven't got the same kind of time for delay and thought and reflection that they used to have.

We also have a somewhat different world in which we live. Throughout the early years of our history the United States was unreachable and therefore unbeatable. That is no longer true. The two or three months' time lapse that we had--we had a multi-polar world where there were many other powers interposed between us and other people who might mean us some harm. This no longer exists. We live in a world where power is much more polarized and in the hands of a much smaller number of nations now than at any time in the past. We face a world in which we see the Soviet Union as a global power, not a continental power like Germany. And Angola has shown us that they are willing and able to project their power to far parts of the world. Thus we have a situation which is quite different from any of those that have gone on before.

When we stop and think that in this year of 1976, perhaps 20 percent of the people of the world live in freedom. Eighty percent of them live with some sort of restrictions upon their freedom. And so, we must guard and protect those freedoms

and those things that enable us to live in ways of our own choosing.

Soviet power today is deployed all over the world. The Soviet Union has immense capabilities China will have them tomorrow. We have throughout the world a series of situations--tinderbox-type situations--of which we must keep track lest they get out of hand. We have billions of petro-dollars, or Euro-dollars, moving around the world and this is a great change from the situation in the past where this type of thing affected us very little as a nation. It is vital to us to know what use is being made of this kind of economic power. It may affect the life, the livelihood of Americans in Atlanta or Omaha or Spokane. It is said that knowledge is power and in a very competitive world in which we live it is essential that our Government have the knowledge of what is going to happen or what may probably happen. We have today in the world detente. We all hope that it will lead to a real relaxation of tensions in which there will be benefits for both sides. However, when I think about detente I am always reminded of an old Russian proverb which says, "C MEDVEDOM DRUZHIS A ZA TOPOR DERZHIS" "--If you make friends with a bear, hold onto your axe."

So we have to watch; if we do make agreements with the Soviets or with anyone else, that whatever agreements we make that there are no violations.

I think one of the things that people often forget is that they normally tend to think of intelligence as merely some form of a weapon to make war. Intelligence can also be a weapon for making peace. What President of the United States could sign an agreement on any kind of arms limitation unless he had some means of verifying that agreement was being respected.

In the early Sixties we had a great debate in the United States about whether or not there was a missile gap. That is no longer possible. We know what they are doing in this area, and, more important, they know that we know. We have to watch around the world for the possibility of nuclear proliferation. In the kind of world we live in there are nations that are in situations of numerical or geographical inferiority where they may feel this is the only chance they have for survival. You have international terrorism which is a new factor that hasn't reappeared since the Middle Ages, which is abroad in the world today. All of this leads us to a much less stable world than the world perhaps some of us have known in the past.

In the old days you could have a surprise blow but it was generally a local one and you were quite easily able to recover from it, if it wasn't a mortal one from the outset. But our lives, our freedoms, our hopes for tomorrow depend on not being surprised. We cannot blind ourselves. If we do, history will not forgive us. Because of the way the world stands right now, if we fall there isn't anybody ready to pick up the torch; there may be in a couple of years, but there isn't anyone right now.

So it is vital that our Government have the information that enables it to make the best decisions possible in the interests of the nation and of world peace. Our job is to collect that intelligence and make it available to those who make the decisions in our country.

We have, as I said, a tremendous threat with which we must cope--military power that never existed in peacetime before. We have oncoming another giant in the form of China. Yet in the last four years the manpower in the United States Government devoted to intelligence has gone down by 40 percent. It has gone down in terms of real dollars. Less than one penny out of every dollar spent by the United States Government goes to the collection of intelligence.

Intelligence provides us with clear, up-to-date information on what is going on in the world today. And in the speed in

which things move, it is essential that the information be up-to-date. If it isn't up-to-date, if you don't get it in in time, it's history not intelligence. It provides a firm basis for what the United States must do to develop its own strength. If we did not know what it was that any potential opponent had, how could we decide what we needed to face the unknown? What means would we have of gauging how threatening or how large or how strong was the unknown? It is good intelligence that keeps the United States defense budget from soaring out of sight because we do know about the Soviet strategic forces, we do know about the Chinese Mainland strategic forces. And this enables us to measure what we need to create a situation in which they will not be tempted to use them. That is, after all, the ultimate purpose: to deter war. A modern war is a catastrophe so great that the victor is scarcely better off than the vanquished. The essential thing is to discourage people from attempting to use that force.

Most of all, the existence of a credible United States intelligence capability inhibits any idea any country might have of trying to cheat or circumvent or surprise us. As I have said, surprise today in a nuclear age is a very different thing from any kind of surprise that we may have known in the past. If you did not have any idea of what the other

side had you would probably have an arms race that would just go on and on and on till everybody involved was broke. But it is the fact that we do have clear and precise knowledge concerning the strategic forces that threaten us that enables us to tailor our forces so that we have the wherewithal to face that situation, but more important, the wherewithal to discourage them from being tempted to the use of those forces and to make deterrence really viable.

People say "why do you need these so-called covert actions" of which they hear. Well there is in the United States a great tendency to say "well all that low, under-handed stuff is all right for the British, the Germans, the Russians, or the French, but not for us pure, noble Americans. The Founding Fathers wouldn't have liked it." Well this does not take into account the realities of American history.

Probably the greatest consumer of intelligence in American history was George Washington. George Washington wrote a letter to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, Colonel Elias Dayton, in which he said this: "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I have nothing further to say on this subject. All that remains for me to tell you is that these matters must be kept as secret as possible. For lack of secrecy such operations, no matter how well-conceived, or how promising the outlook,



generally fail. I am, Sir, your Obedient Servant, George Washington."

Then we have those today who tell us: "Oh, but in a democratic society you have to tell everybody everything and let everything hang out." Well, one night George Washington was staying in Connecticut at the home of a patriot called Holcomb. And in the morning, he got out, got up on his horse and was going to ride off when Mrs. Holcomb came out to see him off. And she said, "General, pray where do you ride tonight?" And he leaned down in the saddle and he said, "Madame, can you keep a secret?" She said, "Of course." He said, "So can I, Madame," tipped his hat and rode off.

But even in those days we still had this feeling that espionage or the collection of intelligence was an immoral thing and so forth. We have a statue of Nathan Hale outside the CIA building. It was put there over my protests, not because he was not a very brave young man and did not utter a very immortal phrase that he regretted that he had but one life to give for his country. My objection to the fact was that he was an agent who was caught on his first mission and he had all the evidence in his shoe. And I am just not sure that's what we should be holding up to our young trainees as the ideal. Furthermore, before that he

committed a grave breach of security. He told a friend of his that he was going behind the British lines to act as a spy. And his friend looked at him and he said, "But, Nathan, how can you stoop so low?" So we had these kind of people then, and his answer was a very good one, which is not as immortal. He said "The need of the nation justifies it." But again he went to Manhattan Island to find out when the British were going to land and where. Unfortunately for him they were already there.

We get on to this question of political action--covert action--about which there has been so much discussion. This again is regarded as some frightful thing: the helping of your friends. Well I think anybody who has studied the record of the last 6,000 years of human history of which we have record has known that throughout all time nations have sought to help their friends and to influence opinion in other countries in a sense favorable to themselves. Americans should be particularly cautious in this respect, I feel, for if there hadn't been extraordinarily large French covert action in North America, we just might not be celebrating a Bicentennial. As a matter of fact, there

were 17,000 Frenchmen ashore in North America before France declared war on Great Britain. We sometimes tend to forget this. We sometimes tend to forget that the British said, "Oh, the French are helping the rebels." And the French went to the U.S. Congress and said you will kindly pass a resolution saying you have received no aid from us. Because if you don't do it we won't give you any more aid. And Congress promptly passed a resolution and said no, they'd never heard of any French aid. But if we had not had that aid, ours would have been a very, very tough and much longer struggle. The idea that helping your friends in another country to resist going under from Communist subversion, to help democratic forces who want to prevent their country from going totalitarian is morally wrong...everybody else is doing it. You've got to live in the real world. No, you don't resort to the kinds of crimes and abuses that the more extreme societies do, but at least this kind of action gives you something between a diplomatic protest and landing the United States armed forces. It helps you contain a crisis or limit a crisis.

As I have said, it is being used against us and anybody who wishes to fight with Marquis of Queensbury rules against somebody who is using brass knuckles, is going to find that his future is not bright. We live in the real world, and in this world intelligence is essential to us.

Now you've all read about the investigations and so forth and so on. I cannot tell you that among the 76,000 people who have passed through the CIA in the last 27 years we haven't had some nogoodnicks, we haven't had some kooks, we haven't had some nuts, we haven't had some overzealots, we haven't had some people who have exercised very poor judgment. But I submit that if you take any community of 76,000 people, subjected to the kind of scrutiny to which we have been subjected over the last 27 years, that our record will be quite respectable. As of today, to my knowledge, not one person in the Central Intelligence Agency has been indicted. Well I ask you to take any community of similar size over a quarter of a century and tell me how that record looks.

Again, I am not trying to justify some of these illegalities or things that were done in the past, but one has to look at the situation at that time and the way people regarded things at that time. For the younger people around here it is difficult to understand the strength of the commitment of the United States in the years following World War II to the principle that it would never be surprised again. It is difficult to understand

the degree of commitment of the American people to the idea of stopping the spread of Communist totalitarianism. To just give a simple example: to us today universal suffrage is absolutely indispensable for democracy. But we didn't have universal suffrage in the first years of the history of our country. You had to have a certain amount of money that you paid in taxes before you were allowed to vote. You cannot run a segregated school in the United States today. Fifteen years ago you could and 30 years ago or 40 years ago you would have gotten in trouble for trying to run anything but that. And if one persists in looking at the past through the eyes of the present one is going to get a distorted picture of the past. So while I am not attempting to justify these things, I am simply attempting to describe the atmosphere in which these people exercised poor judgment or were over-zealous.

The last CIA investigation we had was the Doolittle Report which told us the United States faced a ruthless enemy determined to destroy us by any means at their command, and that the only way we would survive was by matching their dedication with ours and their ruthlessness with ours. So we understand that secrecy is not to be used to cover abuses or wrong-doings, nor do we feel it should be destroyed in order to help a potential enemy.

Those who oppose us know very well how valuable human rights are to us, how much importance we attach to fair play and to our freedom, and to the rights of our citizens and to the open nature of our society. Those who oppose us can and do make full knowledge of their advantage in this respect of the fact that they have no similar or comparable moral restraints in their attempts to alter or control our society.

Again, to go back to this question of the time and what was happening. George Washington organized three separate kidnap attempts on Benedict Arnold and I think most of us know what he was going to do with him when he got hold of him. He also attempted to kidnap George III's son--his fourth son was a midshipman in the Royal Navy in New York in 1782 and he later became King William IV, and, in fact, somebody got killed outside the Prince's door. Years later when this man was then King William IV of Britain, the American Minister told him about this plot, but added that General Washington had sent word the Prince ) was to be treated very kindly. And the Prince said, "Well, I am damned glad he didn't get the chance to show me how kind he was."

Now you take Benjamin Franklin. Benjamin Franklin, for three years before the Revolution, while we were at peace we were part of Great Britain, from 1772-1775 was the Assistant Postmaster of British North America. Do you know what he was doing? He was opening that British mail like crazy. They caught him and they fired him and he went off to Paris as the Head of the Mission there. He asked the French to build him a printing press. And do you know what he printed on that press? British passports, British currency and fabricated atrocity stories for insertion in the British press.

So you have these people who tell us that there was none of this in American history before, this is all new, dirty stuff, we've never done this sort of thing.

When I came into the Army, I went, in 1942, to the United States Army's military intelligence training center. What I am trying to illustrate by this is that this puritanical urge in us has gotten the better of us after all our wars. We generally enter our wars completely defenseless in the intelligence field, we then build up a great apparatus and as soon as the war is over we begin to have moral qualms about it and begin dismantling it. We took a little longer this time because of the Korean and

Vietnamese wars. But generally we've dismantled it. When I got to that U.S. Army military intelligence training center at Camp Ritchie in Maryland in August of 1942, the Commandant of the American Army's intelligence school was a British colonel and the first ten training movies I saw the Cockney dialect was so thick that most of the GI's didn't understand what was going on. So we have to wait a little longer this time for the wreckers to get to work on our intelligence apparatus. And they have been doing their best to do so. And this, in the middle, as I say, of a very tough and a very difficult world.

We have these two great giants in the world today beside ourselves: the Soviet Union and Mainland China--about which I heard an amusing story the other day. It said that President Nixon was in Moscow and he was talking to Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Brezhnev said, "I had a very strange dream the other day." The President said, "What was that?" and he said, "I dreamt I was in Washington and I looked up at the Capitol and there was a great flag flying there." And the President said, "Yes, it is the American flag, it always flies there when Congress is in session." Mr. Brezhnev said, "No, it wasn't the American flag, it had something written on it." And the President said, "What was written on it?"



And he said, "On it was written: 'Kapitalism Perevon-- Capitalism is doomed.'" Mr. Nixon said, "That's strange, I had almost the same dream myself." Brezhnev said, "What did you dream?" He said, " Well, I dreamt that I was in Moscow, I looked at the Kremlin and on the highest tower of the Kremlin there was a great flag flying." Brezhnev said, "Soviet flag, always there." But the President said, "Not, it had something written on it." Brezhnev said, "Written? What did it have written on it?" Mr. Nixon said, "I wish I could tell you, but I can't read Chinese."

We have this kind of a world in which we live with these two giants facing one another. We just cannot be blind and deaf at a time like this.

We've had reorganization, as you know, in the last couple of days, of the intelligence community. This is really a reorganization of the very top part of the structure and we are going to have to organize the lower part of the structure. It establishes at the very top a Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, and has as members the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Deputy to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Centered in this Committee are authorities held by many committees before. These include authorities to conduct certain types of operations

which must be reported to the Congress. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence also has the authority to apportion the money--the resources--throughout the community so we can get the best possible return for our intelligence dollars.

One thing I would like to make plain is that many people have a vision of the intelligence community as everybody squirreling away his own private little information. Well that is simply not true. The Defense Intelligence people, our people, the State people: all are working from the same data base, we are all working from the same telegrams from the same information. Yes, we do have disagreements because the focus of each of us is somewhat different. But at least I don't want you to get the idea that everybody in the intelligence community has got a little secret dispatch that he's hiding from everybody else. That is simply not the way it works. We discuss, we talk, we try to arrive in our national estimates, and we do, in the national estimates we submit to the President, at a general consensus but in which if there are dissents, they are included.

And one thing I must say for Secretary Kissinger is that he not only wants to know what the majority view is, he wants to know what the minority view is and why they feel that way. So many of the documents go forward with notes on

the bottom of the page saying this or that or the other Government department does not agree with this. I think this is very important in assessing what happens and how it happens.

Now how do we collect this intelligence I have been talking to you about? We collect it in three ways: first of all we collect it publicly, openly, through the ordinary newspapers, through the radio and television broadcasts, through open publications of all sorts and through open discussions with the people. I would say that 50 percent of the intelligence published in the publications of the U.S. Government comes from open reporting from U. S. embassies abroad. From the ordinary, normal, State Department reporting. But, of course, as you get further along, the smaller percentages are the more punchy things and are harder to get. For instance, we collect by various technological systems...technological systems of overhead reconnaissance, of all sorts of highly sophisticated technical things, which has been one of the great contributions the United States has brought to the world of intelligence. I think we brought two great contributions: one is the technical and the other is the analytical

capability. I think we have carried the analysis of intelligence, of people working on the same subjects, on the same things, for a very long period of time to a degree that has not been seen elsewhere previously.

You know, unfortunately, I say we tend to carry around our neck the millstone of James Bond, because this is everybody's idea of what somebody does in intelligence. Well, there is a small number of people who do this, but a very small number of people in relation to the total effort. You've heard all about these covert operations. These constitute maybe five or six percent of the funds we expend.

Then you have, finally, the part we've just been talking about: human intelligence. In 1973 we knew perfectly well what the forces were in presence on both sides of the Suez Canal. What we had not gotten into was the decision process to go at two o'clock in the afternoon of the sixth of October. And that sort of intelligence-- short of a lucky break--you could only get from people.

In our society everything is open. Foreigners can acquire information from American magazines that would cost

us a billion dollars to get on their country. As a matter of fact, our problem and the Soviet problem is quite the opposite. We have to piece together the scraps and see what we can make of them; the Soviets are completely submerged by a vast flood of information from the United States and they have to try and figure out what part of it is real and what part of it is phony. We have often found them, for instance, when some American magazine has published some rather important secret, we found them telling spies around the world, "Go find out the truth about this." Because to them, if it isn't stamped "Secret" it can't be true, because it wouldn't be--the United States wouldn't put out this sort of stuff. But we tend to. Some of you may have heard my cannibal story.

Well, a foreigner said to me the other day that he didn't understand why all Americans weren't Catholics and I said, "Why?" "Well," he said, "remember it's the only religion that offers confession for everybody," and then he paused and he said, "but I suppose it's the fact that it's private that's the real drawback." Because we have this irresistible urge.

Sy Hersh, who wrote the original article denouncing us for our various abuses once said, "The United States is a

great country. It's the only country in the world where if you ask a Government official a question, he feels he owes you an answer." Many of the things we discuss in the United States openly and in detail in the press, in other free, democratic countries are never mentioned. They are simply never mentioned. I don't know how many foreigners I've had tell me after driving around the Washington Beltway and seeing that huge sign eight to ten feet tall saying "CIA," "It can't be true. You don't put out a road sign to your secret intelligence service." But we do. For instance, the identity of the Director and my identity is known; there is no other country in the world where publicity is given to this sort of thing.

But, still, we do very well. People ask me often "What has been the impact of all this upon you?" Well, the impact has been one of many. I think we will have fewer zealots, I think we will have fewer kooks, I think we will have fewer people exercising bad judgment. I think we will probably in the end have better intelligence for it. I think that we will develop within the Congress--Congress will develop itself an oversight system which will be more effective and more capable of keeping secrets than has been the case in the past. I think it will exercise

a more effective control. One of the features of the President's program was the setting up of the three-man oversight board, whose sole task would be to look for abuses within the intelligence community--or wrongdoing within the intelligence community. And they have been put up there and every single person who works in intelligence in the United States, if he knows of anything that is being done that is against the law or that is dubious, he can go to that board and report it.

I think we will have a tougher brand of people. Now one of the surprising things to me throughout this has been that we have today a larger number of young people coming out of the universities wanting to work with us than at any time in the 27-year history of the Agency. Now, I am not completely blind to the fact that the state of the economy may be part of this, but not in the measure--this is a three- or four-fold increase. We thought a lot of the older people who lived in a lot of the somewhat excessive secrecy of the past couldn't adapt themselves to the new and changing times. But they have not been leaving in droves. We have less resignations than we have had in any year in the past for the last five or six years.

Yes, as a result of this we have lost some foreign sources who have come to us and said "I just can't stand being associated with you." We had one rather tragic one in which a man said, "If I am executed, please..."--this is behind the other side--"...do not reveal that I had any connection with you." But by and large it would probably be self-serving of me to tell you we've been crippled, we haven't be able to do our job, the American people are helpless and unprotected. I cannot in truthfulness tell you that. I think today we are collecting more and better intelligence than at any time in our history. Why? How? Well, I think a lot of people have come to the conclusion that their best hope for a better life lies in the continuing existence of the United States as a powerful and freedom-loving nation.

We have means of getting this information to the President every day. We give the President a report of the most secret information we have. We report also regularly to the Congress. I think last year we reported some 80 times to different committees of the Congress, apart from the investigation. I am talking about normal reports to our regular oversight committees who are the Armed Services Committees, the Appropriations Committees and the Government Operations Committees and, in some areas, the Foreign Relations Committees.



One of the laws that the President is going to propose is a single joint committee of the House and Senate like the Atomic Energy Commission has for its affairs and which has proved remarkably good at keeping secrets. So out of all this we hope there will come a better understanding of the need for good intelligence, a better guidance for what is permissible and what is not permissible, and we hope some mechanism for change as the perceptions of the American people change as to what they want done in their defense.

And, finally, I would like to say that I am not an old CIA man. I came to the CIA in 1972 for the first time after a lifetime spent in the armed services. People say to me, "How do you feel after four years there?" Well, I say first I feel a little bit like Jonah because it all started just about the time I came on board. Mostly I feel reassured: reassured at the people I found there; reassured at the fact that they are Americans just like other Americans; and they live by the same standards of right and wrong. Reassured at the continuity with which they apply themselves to the solution of problems. Reassured at their competence and dedication, but, most of all, reassured by the people themselves.

History does not often give a second chance. In the nuclear age the best thing we can do is to prevent a first confrontation. And the very fact that we have good intelligence the people know today that the chances of a surprise attack are minimal, that even lesser movements than major mobilization will be noted. We have often told other people when we've seen this. And one of the things that you never get any newspaper headlines for is that very often we have used intelligence to reassure two friendly countries who were sure the other one was going to jump them. We've been in a position to go to both of them and say, "Look, we know what's going on on both sides. He is not going to jump you," and thereby avoid some very unpleasant confrontations.

Winston Churchill told my generation that we would have as our companions on our journey, blood, sweat, tears, and toil. As we move into the last quarter of this century, the most exciting century the world has ever known, I hope that the young generation, who will decide what the world of tomorrow will be like, will have as its companion, three companions: faith to light the road ahead, because the road ahead is dark and if you don't have faith it's even darker;

enthusiasm, which is the mainspring of youth and keeps the older producing; and, courage, which is the greatest of human virtues because it is the guarantee of all the others. That they will have these, these young people who tomorrow will run our country and run the world...they who will decide the tomorrows that my generation will not see. And if they are blind and deaf and do not know the real fact of the world around them it will be much more difficult for them to do that.

All I can tell you is that we in the Central Intelligence Agency, together with our colleagues in Defense Intelligence, and the intelligence part of the three armed services, with the Treasury and State, and the others whose business this is also, we will do our best to not let down the American people who are, after all, the last best hope of most of mankind for a decent peace-loving world.

Thank you very much.

SPEECH

by

LT. GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS

before

THE ROTARY AND KIWANIS CLUBS

Burlington, Vermont

I must admit that it is with very special feelings I come back to Burlington. Not quite 35 years ago, as a private-- a recruit in the Army--I disembarked from the train at Essex Junction where we were met by the Regimental Band of the 187th Field Artillery and marched back to Fort Ethan Allen. This is where, as far as I am concerned, it all began, and I must say that it is a very special feeling I have in coming back here after so many years. I had been back once or twice in the meantime, but this is the first time I have been here to stay for any length of time and I am very happy that this gives me the opportunity of talking with you for a minute about something I think is vital to our country, about which you have heard a great deal and about which, quite frankly, we don't feel you've heard our side of the story sufficiently. I would like to talk about intelligence, what it is, why it is important to the United States and why we need it now more than at any time in our history.

First of all we get down to the fundamental of what is intelligence. Intelligence is information concerning the actions, the capabilities, the intentions--political and military, financial and economic--of foreign countries that may have some impact upon our lives.

Why do we need intelligence? We need it for the same reason George Washington needed it and that every American President has needed it and Government has needed it since then. Except, George Washington, when he left, said "eternal vigilance is the price of freedom" but he was talking about a United States that had a two- or three-month cushion on either side. In all our past, the United States was considered by most of the rest of the world to be unreachable and therefore unbeatable. That is no longer true. The Soviets today are a global power. Germany at the height of its power was a European continental power, it was not a global power. The Soviets have proved in Angola that they are capable and willing of projecting their power 10,000 miles away from the Soviet Union. And we simply have to be better informed than at any time in our history. Knowledge is power. And if our leaders are to deal from a position of strength they must have knowledge of what is going on in the world, especially the world in which we live and in which perhaps only 20 percent of mankind lives under conditions that we would recognize as freedom. North America is no longer outside of all this.

We face today--one of the reasons why we need intelligence-- a situation where for the first time since Valley Forge, other countries have the capabilities to inflict crippling or mortal

damage on us. This has not happened since the early days of our history. The Soviet Union has that kind of power today and has it deployed. China is growing rapidly and will soon move into that area. People are always fascinated by what we do in intelligence and they attach great attention to the espionage part of it which is really a very small part of the collection of intelligence. But the great questions for which the American people and Government are looking to us for answers and I think the great prime questions of tomorrow are: who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from today; what will be their feelings and their dispositions towards us and towards our allies; what is there in Soviet science, research and development, today that will impact upon our lives five or ten years from today. And this is also true of China. China is not quite at the same level, but it will be quite soon.

We have another totally new factor in the world today. That is the factor of economic intelligence. In the past economic intelligence was always considered some sort of a by-product of a military capabilities study. But today we have billions of petro-dollars, we have billions of Euro-dollars, wandering around the world being invested and

used in ways which can affect the livelihood of the American worker. We live in a world where we are trying, through detente, to relax tensions with the Soviet Union. Relax them in a way which will ease the burden on the two countries without unfair advantage for one or for the other.

The Russians, you know, are a people of many proverbs. They always have a proverb for every situation. I was looking through a list of Russian proverbs the other day and I saw a very interesting one. It said, "When you make friends with a bear, do not let go of your axe," and I think this is one we would be well advised to bear in mind.

We have a number of other new problems in the world today which are different in intelligence from former years. First of all you have international terrorism which is almost organized like a government. You have possible nuclear proliferation from people--small countries--who used to rely or trust the guarantees of other countries and who no longer do and feel that only through developing their own nuclear weapons can they possibly ensure their own survival. And there is another factor which I think is not often understood and that is, intelligence is not just a force for war or for strength, it is also a force for peace.



No American President could sign any agreement concerning the limitation of strategic weapons unless he had the means of verifying whether they were or were not living up to that agreement.

We recovered from a naval Pearl Harbor. Could we recover from a nuclear Pearl Harbor?

So the importance of not being surprised is more essential to us today and more vital to the survival of our nation than at any other time. Our lives, our freedoms, our hopes for tomorrow rest upon our not being surprised. We cannot afford to be surprised and history will not forgive us if we are. It is very rare that a nation gets a second chance on something like this.

Yet to acquire this intelligence which is so vital to our nation, what do we do and how do we do it. Well, first of all, less than one penny out of every dollar spent by the United States Government goes to the collection of intelligence and I am talking not just about the CIA, I am talking about the total intelligence effort of the United States: the Defense Department, of the State Department, of the Treasury, of Atomic Energy, of some people at whom you would be surprised at being engaged in the collection of intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The relative cost has

been diminishing right along, both as a part of the National budget, as a part of the Defense budget, and intelligence personnel--personnel devoted to the collection of intelligence in the United States Government--are down by 40 percent since 1969 in spite of these enormous new tasks that are being levied on us, with the sophisticated systems that are coming in, with the requirements for economic intelligence, with the requirements to keep an eye on terrorism and so forth. Now this intelligence provides clear, up-to-date information to our Government on what is going on in the world. And in order to clarify, to establish our own foreign policy, it is very important for our leaders to be well informed. Good intelligence produces a firm support for United States foreign policy. It furnishes a sound basis for the development of our own military strength. I will just ask you for a minute: what would the situation be if we did not have accurate knowledge of the Soviet strategic forces and the U.S. Government had to prepare for any possible eventuality? Can you image what the cost would be to the American people? It is because we know in a very precise manner and to a very precise degree what the forces that could be used against us are, that we are able to tailor our own forces so that the burden upon the American people is not unbearable. It

enables us to plan for contingencies in the future for how we would use our forces if we were required to. Very important, and often overlooked I think, is the fact that the very fact that the United States has an effective and credible intelligence capability inhibits any nation which might be tempted to move against us. No agreements would be possible without effective intelligence. Defense costs would soar out of sight. You would have an arms race that could lead us to a tinderbox.

Now how do we go about collecting this intelligence? Well, we go about it basically in three different ways. We go about it overtly, that is, to say, through the open press, through the open radio broadcasts, and all of the open televisions broadcasts and so forth from all over the world. This is obviously the easiest kind of intelligence to collect, but surprisingly, overt intelligence provides perhaps 50 percent of the total content of our intelligence publications which go to our leaders and to our Congress. But, as I say, this is generally the easiest type of intelligence. But it is remarkable how much even in closed societies like some of the ones we face you can get by reading the press day after day, week after week, and year after year.

Then you have technical intelligence: the vast complex technical systems that we have been compelled to develop to have a look inside these closed dictatorial societies. They can buy American magazines that will give them information that we would have to spend a half billion dollars to get. I think that their problem is a little different from ours. Our problem is how to piece together the scraps we have and make valid intelligence out of them. Theirs is the torrent of information which is available to them and with their suspicious nature they're trying to figure out how much of it is real and how much we're telling them in order to fool them. I am sure one of the great debates going on in the Kremlin now is: what is the U.S. really doing about its intelligence. Obviously they've got some effective intelligence system hidden away, and all this CIA stuff is to draw our attention so that they can operate freely in the other areas.

Bill Colby used to say that one of his problems was scarcity and his counterpart, Mr. Andropov's, is overabundance of information and what to do with it.

But this technical intelligence I think is one of the great contributions the United States has brought to intelligence.

I am inclined to believe that intelligence is really the oldest profession of all. There are others who claim that another profession the oldest. However, you had to know where it was first; therefore, I think, that intelligence can truly be called the oldest profession. Modern intelligence in the sense in which we understand it really started in Britain during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I when Thomas Wallisingham went out and hired himself "five knaves." Ever since then the five knaves and their successors have contributed to make Britain a world power and to shield her through some tremendous conflicts.

But America, I think, has brought two great things to intelligence: one, the technical systems; and two, analysis. Analysis to a degree not seen before in intelligence; the hiring of people with specific knowledge and their devoting years of patient and continuous analysis to the various phenomena which we have to interpret for the United States Government. Finally there is the third--and this is the most difficult form of intelligence--which is the covert or clandestine collection--espionage if you will. Now there are those who raise their eyebrows at this, but I will remind you that the Bible tells us that Moses sent spies into the Land of Canaan, and quite frankly this has been going on as long as mankind has existed in organized societies. We have always had people in our American society who look

down on this. Outside the CIA we have a statue of Nathan Hale which I protested being put there. Not because he wasn't a very brave young man and he didn't utter the immortal lines about regretting that he had only one life to give to his country. But Nathan Hale was a spy who was caught on his first mission and he had all the evidence on him. I am not sure that's what we want to hold up to our young trainees as a model. Furthermore, he was sent to Manhattan to find out when and where the British were going to land. When he got there they were already there with the consequences that you know. And in addition to that, before he went he committed a breach of security. He told one of his friends, a captain in the Revolutionary Army that he was going to spy behind the British lines. And he looked at him and he said, "But, Nathan, how can you stoop so low?" So we've always had those people who regard the collection of necessary intelligence as something un-American or immoral or anything else. Well, I'll get to that in a minute--about what some of the Founding Fathers thought about intelligence and how they used it.

And then you get to the famous, much-discussed covert action, political action in other countries. We are the only people who have ever attempted to codify and put in writing what all nations have done: that is, attempt to

support their friends in other countries, attempt to move the opinion of the other countries in a sense favorable to your own. It has constantly been the feeling of the Presidents of the United States--at least since World War II--that the United States, and Congress has generally gone along with this, that we've got to have something between a diplomatic protest and landing the United States armed forces. We have got to have some means of quietly helping our friends who may be threatened by some kind of Communist subversion, by some kind of expansion, and I think a great many of the younger people do not remember the strength of our commitment in the United States under President Truman and thereafter to prevent the expansion of world communism that could weaken our position in the world.

This part of our activity has gotten out of all proportion in people's minds. It is a very small part of our activity, perhaps five or six percent of our budget is spent on this sort of activity. It is not something that we do lightly. We are not obsessed with espionage for the sake of espionage. If we can get intelligence in an overt way we prefer to do it that way. The ability to be able to do this, to give quiet help to your friends enables you to forestall a crisis and prevents something from growing into a much larger situation.

One of our American feelings has always been that there is something faintly wrong about intelligence. Let me quote some of the Founding Fathers on this. George Washington, in 1779, wrote a letter to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, Colonel Elias Dayton, and this is what he said, "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I have nothing further to add on this score. All that remains is for me to tell you that these matters must be kept as secret as possible. For lack of secrecy, these enterprises generally fail. I am, Sir, your Obedient Servant, George Washington."

Another day, another evening, George Washington spent the night at the home of a sympathizer, a Mr. Holcomb, and in the morning he thanked Mr. Holcomb, mounted his horse and was getting ready to ride away when Mrs. Holcomb came out and said, "General, where do you ride to tonight?" And he leaned low in the saddle and he said, "Madame, can you keep a secret?" She said, "Yes." He said, "So can I, Madame," tipped his hat and rode on.

So the idea the Founding Fathers wanted every single detail to be held out is just not true.

The Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress was asked to present to Congress a list of



the people it employed and how much it paid them. And the Committee of Secret Correspondence said that experience had shown that this was fatal to the people in the projects and did not do so. I will get to the question of what we tell the Congress in the oversight in just a second.

We are the only country in the world that has legislative oversight of our intelligence services. In fact, every day when I go to work and I see that huge road sign with an arrow that says CIA, I know it's the only road sign in the world pointing to the headquarters of the secret intelligence agency of any government in the world, democractic, dictatorial or any where in between. But that is our American way and that is the way we do it.

Now in the past we've had the National Security Act which set up CIA. It was basically set up because Pearl Harbor showed that various parts of the U.S. Government had little pieces of information squirreled away which, if they could have been brought together in some central place, might have enabled us to lessen the cost and the surprise of Pearl Harbor. We, by the Act that set us up, had as our oversight committees the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate. We also had the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate,

because to the contrary of what you may hear, we have to account and justify our budget in the greatest detail in the Executive Branch to the Office of Management and Budget and there are no secrets. And we have to justify it to the Appropriations Committees and the Government Operations Committees of the House and Senate. So, while our budget is not made public it is subjected to exactly the same kind of scrutiny within the Congress.

Now at various times in the past this oversight was not very tightly exercised, because Congress didn't want it that way. We ourselves can live with any kind of oversight the Congress determines. Our Director has expressed a preference and the President has expressed a preference for a single joint committee of House and Senate like the Atomic Energy Committee which has worked very well and has proved very able to keep secrets.

Now to get to these investigations, I would simply like to say that I cannot tell you that in the last 27 years, among the 76,000 people who have passed through the Central Intelligence Agency, that we have not had some kooks, that we've not had some people who have shown some very poor judgment, that

we've not had some people do things that we would rather they had not done. But, I would suggest that if you take any community in the United States of 76,000 people and subject it to the kind of scrutiny to which we've been subjected over the last year and a half, and I think you would find that our record would compare quite favorably with any of those communities or any of those other government organizations. To the best of my knowledge, as of today, no member of the Central Intelligence Agency has been indicted for any intelligence abuse, transgression, or other.

I can't tell you that there haven't been people who have done some things we would rather they had not, but I submit that the number is very small. You've heard some of the various things, for instance, the illegal phone taps. How many did we have? We had 32 illegal phone taps in 27 years. Okay, we should have had none. But how many of you who have a large number of people working for you can guarantee that everything that is going on in your organization is going on in exactly the way you want? And I would call to your attention that the Director of Central Intelligence is the only person in the United States Government who is charged by law with protecting his sources and methods.

I think the last year has made clear to us what the American people are willing for us to do and what they are not willing for us to do. I think everyone of us realizes that we cannot operate an intelligence service that does not have the support of the American people and we certainly intend to abide by whatever is determined. We do feel, however, that attempting to judge the past through the eyes of today does not give you a very accurate description of the circumstances in time.

We all take universal suffrage for granted. But in the early days of our national history, we did not have universal suffrage. We had the signers of the Declaration of Independence who said that all men were created equal, while they themselves owned slaves. You can't run a segregated school today. Twenty-five years ago you could and fifty years ago you would have gotten in trouble for trying to run any other kind.

Most of these transgressions and various things with which we have been charged date back to the Fifties and Sixties.

Now I think we've got this out in the open, we've got this clarified, and I think we can go forward on the basis

of the new rules, on the basis of the Restrictions Order that the President has put out making it quite clear what can and cannot be done. We do not believe that secrecy should be used to cover abuses, but we do not believe that we should tell the whole world everything about what we're doing. Those who oppose us know very well as people what importance we attach to the rights and freedoms of our citizens and of fair play. And they, on their hand, do not have this kind of constraint or moral restraint on their attempts to control or alter our society.

We Americans have a very strong feeling about these things. The head of a friendly foreign service told me a story that I think is a little bit unkind to us but it is a little illustrative too. He said that on an island in the Pacific the cannibals captured three guys: one was a Frenchman, one was an Englishman and one was an American. The Chief said to them, "I have bad news and good news for you. The bad news is that we're going to eat you for lunch tomorrow and we'll have to kill you fairly early in the morning to get the cooking completed in time. Now after that bad news you need some good news and the good news is that I'll give you anything you want in the meantime short of setting you free." So he turned to the Frenchman and

he said, "What do you want?" The Frenchman said, "Well, if I am going to be executed in the morning I think I would just as soon spend the remaining time with that beautiful cannibal girl over there." So they said okay and they untied the Frenchman and he and the cannibal girl went off in the woods. Then they turned to the Englishman and said, "What do you want?" The Englishman said, "I want a pen and paper." They said, "What do you want a pen and paper for?" He said, "I want a pen and paper to write the Secretary-General of the United Nations to protest against the unjust, unfair, and unsporting attitude you are showing towards us." So they said okay and they gave the Englishman a hut and pen and paper and he went off to write. Then they turned to the American and said, "What do you want?" The American said, "I want to be led into the middle of the village, I want to be made to kneel down, and I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the rear end." And the Chief said to his Vice-Chief, "That's a wierd request but the Americans are a wierd bunch anyway, and since we promised, we'll do it." So they led the American into the middle of the village and made him kneel down and the biggest cannibal took a running leap, kicked the American in the rear end and knocked him about 15 feet. Now the American had been hiding a submachine

gun under his clothes and at this point he took it out, cut down the neighboring cannibals. The rest fled. The Frenchman, hearing the gunfire came out of the woods; the Englishman hearing the gunfire came out of his hut, and they looked at the American standing there with his smoking gun in his hand and they said, "Do you mean to say you had that gun the whole time?" The American said, "Sure," and they said, "Why didn't you use it before now?" The American-- and this is the foreigner telling me the story--looked at them with an expression of hurt sincerity and he said, "But you don't understand. It wasn't until he kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral justification for this extreme and violent action."

We live in a tough, tri-polar world today. The buffer states that existed between us and potential aggressors are no longer there. The Soviets and Chinese face one another in a confrontation of serious proportions.

If I may, just one more story: I heard this story that when Mr. Nixon went to Moscow, Mr. Brezhnev said to him that he had had a strange dream. Mr. Nixon said, "What was that?" and Mr. Brezhnev said, "I dreamt I was in Washington and I was looking at the Capitol and there was a huge flag flying over the Capitol." Mr. Nixon said, "Yes, that's the

American flag. It flies there whenever Congress is in session." Brezhnev said, "No, it wasn't the American flag; it had something written on it." Mr. Nixon said, "Written? What did it have written on it?" Brezhnev said, "It had written on it 'Capitalism is Doomed'." Mr. Nixon said, "That's strange, I had almost the same dream." Brezhnev said, "What did you dream?" "Well," he said, "I dreamt I was in Red Square in Moscow and I was looking at the Kremlin and on the highest tower of the Kremlin there was a huge flag flying." Brezhnev said, "That's the Soviet flag; it flies there day and night." Mr. Nixon said, "No, it wasn't the Soviet flag, it had something written on it." Brezhnev said, "Written? What did it have written on it?" Mr. Nixon said, "I wish I could tell you but I can't read Chinese."

We have the Middle East; we have Angola; we have Ethiopia and Somalia; we have possible further North Vietnamese aggression in Southeast Asia; we have a number of problems facing us in the world. And I believe that the real issue before the American people is not the transgressions of 20 or 25 years ago; it is whether the United States will have eyes to see and ears to hear as it moves into the last quarter of this century.



I just want to tell you one more thing. People often say: how are the people at the Agency, how is it doing? and so forth. I am not an old CIA man. I came there for the first time four years ago. The first thing I would like to say is that if I were to sum up all my feelings about the CIA in one word, I would sum them up in the word reassurance. Reassurance because these are Americans like all the others; who live by the same standards of right and wrong as other Americans. Reassurance at the steadfastness of these people under a bombardment I think without parallel in American history, who are continuing to produce what I believe is the finest intelligence any government in the world is having set before it.

If I may quote another old Russian proverb that ante-dated perhaps Mr. Truman's story about "if you can't stand the heat stay out of the kitchen," the Russian proverb is "...if you fear wolves, don't go into the forest," and we have a lot of people who do not fear wolves, who are in a most dedicated and steadfast manner giving to the President, to the Secretaries of State and Defense and Treasury and others, to the Congress, the kind of information I think is essential if we are to survive.

The President has recommended a program, he's put out an Order of Restrictions stating specifically what is not acceptable; he is recommending legislation which is necessary to the Congress. We, on our part, will continue to do our best. We can live with whatever program they bring out, provided that there is some protection given to the men and women who, in dangerous places around the world every day--on a silent battlefield about which little is said--are risking their lives and their families' lives to make sure that the American people are not surprised again. And frankly, this is a tough task. It is an unending task and we have no alternative, for if we fall there is no one else to pick up the torch. I do not think we will fall.

Thank you very much.

SPEECH

by

LT. GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS

before

SENATOR'S YOUTH CONFERENCE

OKLAHOMA CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

13 February 1976

...Thank you very much.

In all fairness, in the light of what the Senator said to you, probably two or three years ago I wouldn't have been here either. But times have changed and if we have to do our job we need the understanding of the American people, for what we do and why we do it.

I would like to talk to you today a little bit about what is intelligence, how do we get it, and why it is important to us.

What is intelligence? Intelligence is information concerning the actions, capabilities, intentions, activities of foreign countries that may have an impact on our lives and the way we live. How do we get it? We get it by various means. A great deal of it we get through public means--it is quite astonishing, even in the relatively closed countries, how much intelligence is to be obtained from reading the newspapers or listening to the radio broadcasts.

One of the curious things during the war was how much information we could get from the German newspapers. The Germans have a great tradition, for instance, when anybody is killed or dies, of putting an advertisement in the newspaper and we could get the German newspapers and see a death

notice for somebody who died while fighting in such-and-such a division near Orel or Tula or somewhere else, which would tell us, at least as of that date, where that particular unit was.

We have people who have been reading the Minsk Pravda for 25 years. And if you read the Minsk Pravda for 25 years you not only know what's going on in Byelorussia, but you know a good deal of the relative move up the ladder of various people and what they are doing and where they are going.

One of the more interesting things is the listening to foreign broadcasts: what they're telling other people in different languages, and what they're telling their own people in their own language. You can sense, often long in advance of any public decision, the shift in the way they are presenting these things to their own people or abroad.

Then we collect with technical means. Technical means of all sorts which I think has been one of the great contributions the United States has made to the collection of intelligence.

I always say that intelligence is really the oldest profession; other people claim that other professions are the oldest professions. I claim that you had to know where it was before the other one could operate and, therefore,

intelligence was the first profession. And you all remember about Moses sending those spies into the land of Canaan, so this is nothing new in human history.

But in this technical thing, really the intelligence services as we know them now began during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I in England, when Thomas Walsingham went out and hired himself "five knaves." And that was really the beginning of British intelligence. It has operated ever since .

I was discussing at lunchtime how Benjamin Franklin set up his office in Paris and the British intelligence was endeavoring and they endeavored successfully to penetrate that office. In fact, when the French told Benjamin Franklin that they were going to enter the war against Great Britain, 42 hours later that information was in the hands of the British Government--and 42 hours was just about what was required to ride a horse to the Channel, take a boat across, and ride a horse to London.

As a matter of fact, an interesting anecdote: the other day I was in Florida and I had lunch with Anthony Eden, who is now 79 years old, and he was the British Foreign Minister during the Ethiopian problem with Mussolini and during the war and later he was the British Prime Minister. He was telling me about

one of his ancestors who was in America during the Revolutionary War and he was persecuted because he was very sympathetic with the American cause. I said, "Yes, but another one of your ancestors was busily penetrating Benjamin Franklin's office in Paris." And he looked at me and he said, "Oh, you know about that, do you?" Because one of his ancestors, William Eden, was the chief of British intelligence in Paris during the Revolution.

We have brought all of the genius of America in technology and science to help us get information from above, from below, from the sides, and through all of the means one can conceive.

In 1960 we had a great debate in this country as to whether there was a missile gap with the Soviet Union or not. Nobody knew the answer. Such a debate would be impossible today. We do know the answer; we do have the means of verifying what is going on.

People always think of intelligence as a force for war, but it is also a force for peace. It would be impossible for any President of the United States to sign an agreement on any kind of arms limitation with the Soviet Union or with China unless he had the means of verifying that that was being complied with. I think it is an aspect of intelligence that is not often understood.

Another aspect for which we get no credit is that sometimes you've had nations that believe that other of their neighbors were about to jump them or about to attack them. Several times we have been able to tell and reassure both sides that the other one was simply not deployed in a position to attack them, and thereby, perhaps, avoided a miscalculation by one against the other.

And, finally, because we face these closed societies in which, for instance, we have to expend millions of dollars to get information which they can obtain in our country by subscribing to magazines. They can get crosscuts of U.S. missile silos with concrete thicknesses and everything else, the sort of information that we have to expend enormous effort to get.

Now why do we need this intelligence? We need this intelligence because we have deployed today a capability against the United States--I am not talking about the intention to use it, I am just talking about the capability--greater than any that has been deployed against us since Valley Forge. In the past all of our wars have been fought with local powers, in a sense. Germany, even at the height of her power, was a European power. Basically, outside of



submarine attacks and maybe one or two freakish bomber raids, Germany had no capability against the United States. But as we look, we see the Soviet Union, whose armed forces have increased in the last five years by one million men whereas the armed forces of the United States have decreased in that same period by one million men; net difference: two million. We see the Soviet Union deploying five new third-generation ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States-- more accurate and with greater range than any of their predecessors. We see the Soviet Union building large numbers of submarines that can launch missiles; we see the Soviet Union developing aircraft with capabilities against the United States as well as against their peripheral neighbors, China, or NATO Europe. We see the Soviets improving enormously the equipment of their conventional forces against NATO Europe and in the Far East. We see them improving the training of these forces: the quality of the Soviet forces is higher than at any time since World War II. We see them quite prepared through proxies and otherwise to move their power elsewhere. We see a Soviet Navy conducting a tremendous building program, able to project Soviet presence all over the world. They used to have a coastal navy, now they have a blue water navy. And we see all of these capabilities in

the Soviet Union. Tomorrow China will have these capabilities. And for the first time in our history people will have a capability to strike crippling or mortal blows at the United States; something that has not existed before.

When George Washington said "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," he was talking about a country which had a two-month cushion on either side. We don't have that anymore: we have a 15- to 30-minute cushion now.

So we must know what is going on. If anybody were to ask me what are the four great questions before the CIA and the American intelligence community--that is, our colleagues in Defense, in Treasury, and elsewhere--I would say that the great questions we have to answer are: Who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from today; what will their dispositions be towards us and towards our allies; what is there in Soviet research and development today that will impact on our lives in the years ahead--in your time--and the same questions for China. These are the really enormous questions for which the policy-makers look to us.

And here I would like to emphasize that the CIA is not a policy-making organization. We simply provide the information. Sometimes they will tell us they are considering four or five options and we will say that if you take option one, this is what's likely to happen; if you take option two, this

is what's likely to happen. When I go to a meeting where policy is being discussed, I give an intelligence briefing. When State, Defense, and Treasury and the others discuss what is to be done, I don't speak. I am not in on the policy discussion. All we do is provide the intelligence on which they base their decision as to what is to be done. So this myth of an "invisible government" pulling strings and deciding policy, simply does not correspond to the facts.

Now, we have a feeling that perhaps all of this is something new and is wrong and is un-American. There is definitely a sort of campaign that intelligence is un-American, dishonest and so forth. Well, if you go back in our history there is no basis for this.

George Washington was probably the greatest consumer of intelligence we ever had. In this Bicentennial Year I have done some research on the subject of intelligence in the Revolution and it's very interesting. The first thing that I think sums up George Washington's position better than anything else is a letter he wrote to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, Colonel Elias Dayton, in which he said this, "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I have nothing further to add on this score. All that remains for me to tell you is that these matters must be kept as secret as possible. For lack of secrecy these enterprises,

no matter how promising the outlook, or well-conceived, generally fail. I am Sir, your obedient servant." George Washington.

Then you get this business that you've got to tell everybody everything, you've got to discuss everything, you've got to let it all hang out. Well, again we have a quote from George Washington on that. One night in Connecticut he spent the night at the home of a Mr. Holcomb who was a sympathizer with the Revolution. In the morning he got up on his horse to ride on and Mrs. Holcomb came out and said, "General, where do you ride tonight?" He leaned down in the saddle and he said, "Madame, can you keep a secret?" She said, "Of course." He said, "So can I, Madame," tipped his hat and rode off.

Our responsibility is to tell our leaders what the situation is as we see it. That is why we were created as an independent organization, that is independent of any particular cabinet office. We are responsible by the National Security Act to the National Security Council, to the President, to the Congress through our appropriate oversight committees who were set forth in the Act which created us. And principally those are the Armed Services Committees, of which your Senator from Oklahoma is one of the

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members to whom we report and from whom we have no secrets. Only through their support can we obtain what we need: the funds and the authority to do what we have to do.

Now in America we have had a tradition during our wars of developing a great intelligence network and destroying it immediately after the war. We've done this in every one of our wars. The one thing I will not--well I suppose I will tell you is that during the war Washington had a fort in southwest Virginia at which he trained his intelligence personnel. The only thing that bothers me is the name of the fort, the fort was Fort Looney, so we don't talk much about that. But we've had this tradition of doing this. Now in the first World War we built up a very good intelligence capability, but in 1932, Mr. Stimson who was then Secretary of State was handed a decoded message of another country--diplomatic traffic. He pushed it away saying, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." Ten years later as Secretary of War he couldn't get his hands on enough "other gentlemen's mail." I don't want to blame Mr. Stimson, but it was that kind of a mentality that led us to Pearl Harbor. And we were able to recover from a naval Pearl Harbor. Could our nation recover from a nuclear Pearl Harbor?

The responsibility on us in intelligence is greater than at any time in any country in history because the United States is the last best hope of freedom. There is no one waiting to pick up the torch if we drop it. It is not just a responsibility for our own country, it is the responsibility for the survival of human freedom in the world that weighs on our shoulders and it is a very heavy responsibility.

You've heard a lot about the so-called transgressions of the intelligence agencies and, yes, I can't tell you there haven't been abuses; I can't tell you, for instance, that in the 76,000 people who have passed through the CIA that we didn't have some kooks, some overzealots, some people who showed very bad judgment. We did. But I submit that the number of these things, when you consider the 76,000 people and the 27-year period, was very small. They were aberrations; for instance, you've heard about the famous telephone taps. There were 32 telephone taps in 27 years. And the Director of Central Intelligence is the only person in the United States who is charged by law, by statute, with the protection of his sources and methods.

I want to just talk about what intelligence is to the United States and how it is represented. Intelligence costs less than one penny out of every dollar that is spent

by the U.S. Government, that is to know what everyone else is doing. There is one area that has grown in importance enormously and that is economic intelligence. In the old days economic intelligence was a sort of by-product of military intelligence studies. Today, with billions of dollars in petro-dollars, in Euro-dollars, washing around the world in ways that can affect your livelihood and your job, it is fundamentally important for the United States to know what is happening; to know, for instance, what the harvest in the Soviet Union is going to be like, what effect that will have on Soviet foreign policy, how it will push them. The Chinese the same way. These are vitally important to the life and business of our nation.

Now the effort the United States is expending on intelligence, in spite of this growing area in which we are being asked to provide information, has been downward. The manpower devoted to intelligence in the United States has gone down by 40 percent in the last six years. Intelligence is today a smaller portion of the budget of the United States than at any time in the last 20 years. And yet, the missions and the complexities of the missions that are being tasked upon us are greater than at any other time. To fight inflation we must know what is going on in the rest of the

world because of the impact it will have on us. Intelligence provides us with clear, up-to-date knowledge of what is going on in the world around us.

I would just ask you what would happen do you think to the defense costs of the United States if we had no idea what we were preparing to face, if we didn't know what the Soviets or the Chinese or anybody else had. We would have to prepare for an enormous unknown. It is because we have an accurate knowledge of what they have that we are able to tailor our own requirements to face up to that in a manner which does not destroy our way of life and how we plan the expenditures of our funds. That intelligence provides us with a sound basis for developing our own military requirements, our own military strengths, and above all, the existence of an effective U.S. intelligence capability inhibits anybody who would be thinking of trying to surprise or do something to the United States. They know that we know and that in itself is a very calming effect. The very fact that the U.S. has this kind of capability is terribly important.

As I mentioned previously, none of these agreements would be possible without this. Our defense costs would soar out of sight if we did not know what it was we had to prepare against. If we did not know, you could have



an arms race that could lead to a tinderbox. It is this knowledge of what they have and what we need that makes it possible for us to keep some control and some handle on what we're doing ourselves.

Now the third means by which we collect intelligence is clandestine or secret intelligence. I often say that we carry the millstone of James Bond around our shoulders because this is the exciting part of intelligence and it really represents a very small part of what we do, but a very important part of what we do. In the closed societies which we face, like the Soviet Union, and who are conducting espionage against us on a vastly greater scale than we are conducting against them, it is important for us to know-- to get into the decision-process as to whether any of this force they have will be used and if so, where, how, and in what measure.

Many times we are in a position technically to tell what forces are in presence, but no technical means will get you inside a man's head. Only people can tell you about other people. And, so, we must use this particular method even though to some of us it may seem unpalatable.

Outside the CIA office in Langley, we have a statue of Nathan Hale. I will be honest with you, I was not one of the ones in favor of putting it there. Nathan Hale was a very brave young man who uttered some immortal lines about having only one life to give to his country. But I couldn't help but feel that any intelligence agent who was caught on his first mission and had all the evidence on him is not necessarily what we should be holding up to our young trainees. Furthermore, he committed an additional breach of security. Before he went behind the British lines he told one of his buddies that he was going to do this--and we had those people even then because his buddy looked at him and said, "But Nathan, how can you stoop so low as to be a spy?" But Nathan Hale said, "Whatever the nation needs, I will do." He also went to Manhattan to find out when the British were going to land. Unfortunately for him, they had already landed. So this is, again, one of the reasons why I was not wildly enthusiastic when holding this up as the great example to our young trainees.

But all this clandestine business is a very small part of the total budget of the CIA. But the idea that we have analysts who for 25 years have been watching certain aspects of what's going on on the other side is not very

exciting and doesn't make good television programs and so it doesn't draw much attention.

Why do we need these clandestine activities and this covert help? Well the other side has the Brezhnev doctrine which says the Soviet Union has the right to use its armed forces to safeguard the achievements of any socialist state. What we've got to decide is whether we want to have any quiet means of providing help to our friends, of whether we want to have anything between a diplomatic protest and landing the U. S. armed forces. Every nation throughout history has attempted to advance the cause of its friends and to undo the causes of its enemies. This is not something that we've done, but we Americans sometimes have this rather puritanical view of things. Like it said in the Bible, "I thank thee, Lord, that I am not as other men, a sinner like that publican." And you remember which one came down from the Temple?

The fact is, our nation must survive. We have a responsibility even greater than the responsibility to our own people. We have the responsibility to human freedom to make sure that we do not go under.

Every other nation uses these methods against us. It's all very well to say that if he is attacking me with brass knuckles, I am going to fight him with boxing gloves. But you are not going to be in good shape if you do that.

Yes, as I told you, there have been some abuses and some things we would have preferred not to happen. But again I submit that these were in very small measure and they have been distorted out of all context.

You've heard all about the assassination report. What was the end conclusion of the assassination report? Nobody was assassinated. Then you heard all about the toxins. What was the conclusion? The toxins were never used. Then you heard about the drugs. Yes, somebody used very bad judgment in giving a drug to someone without his knowledge, but this was at a time when we saw various people behind the Iron Curtain who had resisted all the pressures and tortures of the Nazis suddenly falter. And we all thought it was done with mind-bending drugs that could be used against us. We had to know something about them so that we could counter them. For instance, the United States between the two World Wars undertook not to use poison gas. That did not prevent the United States from manufacturing many millions of poison gas shells which we never used but which we held in reserve in case they were used against us.

Yes, a lot of things were discussed in a very different environment when the commitment of the United States never to be

surprised again and the commitment of the United States to contain Communism was extremely strong.

The last CIA investigation by General Doolittle told us that the United States was facing a ruthless enemy determined to destroy us by every means at its command and we must match their ruthlessness with ours and their dedication with ours.

We understand that secrecy must not be used to cover abuses. Someone asked me the other day, "How do you end abuses in intelligence?" and I said that as long as intelligence agencies, like any other organizations, are made up of human beings, you can try to minimize them. It is a foolish delusion to think that you can end them. What you must do is to establish a system where if anybody does something that is against the law or against what is accepted, you must have the means of having sanctions against them. But, again, I caution judging people today in the standards of other times is a very difficult thing to do.

We had a group of young Congressmen out to the Agency and they were discussing assassinations and one of them said, "Yes, but if anybody could have gotten Hitler during 1944-45 he would probably have been the first joint recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor and the

Victoria Cross." And another one said, "But if you could have gotten him in 1935 or '36, think how many lives you would have saved?" And I said, "Congressman, are you advocating assassination in peacetime? We were at peace with Germany." He said, "Oh, but that's different." Well, it was different because we knew what followed afterward. Assassination is against the Law of God, it's against the Law of Man, and its impractical for other reasons because it generally produces an even greater fanatic. So it is not (good).

Long before these investigations, within the CIA a directive was put out saying assassination would not be even considered. You didn't hear much about that; you heard about things that had happened about 25 or 30 years ago in a very different time.

Those who are against us know what we are like as a people. They know what importance we attach to fair play, to the rights of our citizens, and the open nature of our society. They can and do make full use of their advantage in not having comparable standards, or comparable moral principles, in their attempts to control or alter our society.

This is a tough, tri-polar world. In the old days the United States had allies who interposed themselves between us and our enemies. We have two giant world powers facing us today and I can't help but think that the real issue before the American people is not some of these abuses that were committed in small numbers 20 or 25 years ago, but the real issue before us is will the United States, as we enter the last quarter of this century, have eyes to see and ears to hear or will we stumble blindly forward until we have to face the alternatives of abject humiliation or nuclear blackmail. I think the good sense of the American people will win out. I do not think we will go to either of those. We will do our part in intelligence to make sure that our nation is not surprised.

All I want to tell you is that I am very happy to have this opportunity to come here and be able to talk to you because you are our only hope for the tomorrows that my generation will not see.

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